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Abstract
The policy of self-regulation, which is cen-
tral to occupational safety and health law in
the United. Kingdom, is reviewed in the
context of the catering industry. The influ-
ence of service and service quality on self-
regulation and safety climate is considered.
Some previously unpublished fiudings from
a larger study on the factors affecting safety
behaviour in lecturer chefs are reported and
examined in terms of the above.
It is suggested that the traditional auton-
omy and autocracy of chefs in catering
organisations give them a pivotal role in
self-regulation. In addition, the pursuit of
service quality influences the chefs in certain
ways, some of which may be negative in
terms of safety management. It is argued
that the pivotal role of chefs in delivering
service quality can potentially adversely
affect his or her role in safety management.
Finally, it is proposed that the conflict
between safety and production in the service
industries may be more acute than in manu-
facturing because of the need for worker
and, more particularly. supervisor concur-
rence rather than mere compliance with ser-
vice quality strategies.
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UK is heavily influenced by the paliey of
self-regulation. This policy comes from the
view that those who produce risks from
work activities should be responsible for
assessing and managing those risks.
Furthermore, they should do this via the
same or similar mechanisms by which they
manage their businesses generally.
The concept of self-regulation was intra-
dueed by the Robens Committee (Robens
1972). The experience of Robens and his
Committee was, at that time, largely of
manufacturing industries. The service indus-
tries were a much smaller and less well
recognised part of the UK economy than
they are today. This paper addresses the
question of whether the policy of self-regu-
lation is as appropriate to the service indus-
tries as it is to the manufacturing industries
for which it was developed. It will also con-
sider the potential effect of the current drive
for service quality in the service industries
on safety management and safety climate.
Researchers have offered various interpre-
tations of the term 'safety climate' (see, for
example, Maguire et al. in prep.). In this
paper, the authors have chosen an interpre-
ration of the term broadly similar to that
used by Zohar (1980), thar is thar safery cli-
mate is a sununary of perceptions that
employees share about the importance of
safety in their work envirorunent. This cli-
mate will inevitably guide the safety behav-
iour of individual workers.
The catering industry has over recent years
suffered a disproportionate level of accidents
in relation to the inherent risks of the indus-
ny (Health and Safery Executive (HSE)
1997a). In the five-year period 1994/5 to
1998/9, there were 3,409 major injuries and
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12,777 'over rhree day' injuries reported by
private catering organisations alone under the
Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and
Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1985
and 1995. lr is known rhar rhere is a high
level ofunder-reporting in the catering indus-
try (HSE 2000) and rhese figures arelikelyro
represent around 23 per cent of the aetua1
levels.
The first part ofthe paper concerns the pol-
icy of self-regulation, the role of the chef as a
manager and the concept of service. The sec-
ond part report<> some previouslyunpublished
findings from a larger study into the factors
that influencethe safety behaviour of lecturer
chefs (Maguire & Howard 2001). These fac-
tors will be examined in the context of the
issues considered in the first part.
The policy of self-regulation
A fundamental belief expressed in the report
by rhe Robens Committee (Robens 1972)
is that the primary responsibility for reduc-
ing levels of accident and ill health at work
lies with those who create the risks. The
Committee also expressed the view that the
system which existed at the time ofits report
encouraged too much reliance on state reg-
ulation and too little on responsibility and
voluntary self-generating effort.
From these ideas of responsibility and vol-
untary effort was born the concept of self-
regulation. Self-regulation depends on three
major elements: effective management, spe-
cialist advice and worker involvement. It is
the first of these elements that will be con-
sidered here in terms of the catering industry
and, more particularly, the role of the chef.
There is some conflicting opinion on the
efficacy of self-regulation in safety manage-
menr. Dawson et al.. (1988) conclnded rhar
self-regulation, as a policy to promote safety,
has its limits. They point out that the state-
ment in the Robens Report that "It is gener-
ally accepted that the primary operational
-
responsibility for ensuring safe working must
rest with line management" is rather at odds
with the Health and Safety at Work ere Act
1974, which itself contains nothing specific
about line management accountability.
The Robens Report is more specific on
the subject of line management when it talks
about first line supervisors: "It is the super-
visor who is on the spot and in a position to
know whether safety arrangements are
working in practice. His influence can be
decisive. Both here and abroad, wherever
we have seen outstanding safety and health
arrangements, it has been dear that a key
role is played by well trained supervisors
who are held accountable for what happens
within their sphere of control."
Nichols & Armsttong (1973) examined
the role of first line supervisors and report~
ed several examples from their research of
foremen actively encouraging dangerous
practices in order to preserve the rate ofpro-
duction. In their study of a factory work-
shop of 70 workers, they found that
although the foremen played a key role in
the safety system of the factory, they were
also the people immediately responsible for
the pressure on employees to keep up pro-
duction. The suggestion is therefore that
effective safety management and thus self-
regulation itself are compromised or even
opposed by the pressure for production.
Nichols (1997) questions rhe validity of
self-regulation and attributes the confidence
that Robens had in it to the Committee's
key assumption that apathy was the most
important single cause of accidents, an
assumption which Nichols finds unreason-
able.
Dawson et al. (1984), in their study of
safety management in various chemical
plants, found a significant level of conflict
between production interests and safety as
perceived by supervisors and junior man-
agers. However, they did not find the level
Vol. 5, Issue 1, 2001
JOURNAL OF THE eenrunou OF OCCUPATIONAl. SAFETY AND HEALTH
SAFETY CLIMATE IN THE SERVICE INDUSTRIES: THE EXAMPLE OF CATERING OPERATIONS
of active discouragement of good safety
behaviour that was reported by Nichols &
Arrnstrong (1973).
The role of the chef as a first line
manager
The traditional role of the chef is often high-
ly authoritarian, resulting in a very top-
down management structure in the kitchen.
This means that the chef is a very potent
first line supervisor and, as such, may reduce
the necessityfor those higher up in the man-
agement chain to intervene in kitchen activ-
ities.
The view of the chef as an authoritarian
manager, however, has been pointed out by
Haukedal & Larsen (1998) to be at odds
with the way in which chefs, particularly
head chefs, exercise their autonomy.
Haukedal & Larsen found that the head chef
is often acutelyaware of the need to manage
in a parricipative way rather than assume a
command-control style of management.
Even here, however, the head chef was real-
ly only concerned with autonomy in relation
to his or her own situation; there was no
apparent encouragement of self-manage-
ment in staff or promotion of the apprecia-
tion of intrinsically motivating elements of
subordinates' tasks.
Another point made by Haukedal &
Larsen is that chefs can be described as
'knowledge workers'. Knowledge workers
can be particularly difficult to assimilate into
conventional management structures and
systems for a number of reasons. Firsdy,
knowledge, unlike materials, production
equipment and products, will always be the
property of the employee rather than the
employer. This tends to cause a shift in the
balance of power in an organisation away
from the employer and towards the employ-
ee. Secondly, knowledge work is particularly
difficult to superviseeffectively. It is not easy,
particularly for those outside the kitchen, to
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supervisepeople whose expertise rather than
work rate is a key pan of their job.
Stinchcombe (1986) noted a similar phe-
nomenon in the construction industry
where, for different reasons, skilled workers
self-administer their work more than the
stereotypical factory worker. The seasonal
nature of the work makes it uneconomic for
the industry to employ a separate adminis-
trative cadre. Finally, the autonomy which is
necessary for knowledge workers to function
may result in a reluctance to accept direct
supervision. In fact, any threat to knowledge
workers' autonomy may result in opposing
behaviour which has been termed 'psycho-
logical reactance' (Brehm & Brehm 1981).
Service and service quality
Catering is a .setvice industry. Put simply
this means that although, for example, the
food. sold in a restaurant is a product, as is a
car produced by a motor manufacturer;
much of what the customer buys and values
is not contained in that product. For exam-
ple, people will pay for a drink in a public
house in the knowledge that exactly the
same product would cost far less if bought
in a supermarket and consumed at home.
The customer is paying for intangible ele-
ments of the service - the ambience of the
establishment, music and company. A major
characteristic of service industries is the
point at which the service provider and the
service consumer confront one another in
the service arena - called "the moment of
truth" by Norman (1984).
This 'moment of truth' is particularly vis-
ible in the catering industry. To take a sim-
ple example: most products delivered late in
a manufacturing or retail situation would
result in a reduction in customer satisfaction
and, in some cases, a fmancial penalty. In
catering operations, a meal delivered late
may well result in non-payment by the cus-
tomer as the whole service is adversely
--
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affected. This is because the precise timing
of the delivery of the food is an important
part of the product. Thus, although there
are clear similarities between the perceived
quality of the service product and of other
products, there are key differences that arise
from the complexity of the service activity
and the way in which it is perceived by the
customer. Shams & Hales (1989) explored
the issue of goods versus services in hospi-
tality further. They argue that the service
'product' exists along a continuum of vary-
ing degrees ofgoods (eg food), transforma-
tion ofgoods (eg cooking) and interperson-
al activities (eg the behaviour of the waiter).
There has been a considerable amount of
research (reviewed by Iohns (1992» into the
marketing of the 'huspitality product', and
particularly the quality elements of it. Iones
(1983) has described the carering product
itself as the "meal experience". Iohns &
Howard (1996) found in an investigation at
10 Swiss restaurants that, although food
quality is the most important component in
customers' perception of the meal experi-
ence, quality of service and the atmosphere
of the restaurant are also very important.
The question that the authors wish to
address in this paper is the extent to which
the pursuit of service quality is compatible
with good safety management. The follow-
ing initial fmdings from field investigations
begin to address this question.
The perception of safely versus
service considerations: some results
from a study of lecturer chefs
Ten lecturer chefs and one master baker from
a leading hotel school were interviewed and
asked about service, the pressure of service
time and potential conflicts with safety
behaviour in the kitchen. These individual
interviews were part of a larger study - the
method and full results of which are repon-
ed in Maguire & Howacd (2001). Lecturer
--
chefs were chosen for the study as the train-
ing environment is less complex than the
commercial environment and there are fewer
unknown and confuunding factors operating
in the workplace.
The findings reponed in this pape~ how-
ever, largely reflect the lecturer chefs' experi-
ences prior to working in training organisa-
tions. They relate therefore to the industry
in general rather than to the training envi-
ronment.
The responses that the participants gave
illustrated a nwnber of themes:
• The pressure for service to a defined
quality and 'on time'.
• The attirude of chefs and their line
managers towards safety management.
• The contribution of the first two factors
to an organisational safety climate.
• The ways in which the catering situation
compares with the 'traditional' industrial
situation.
The pressure for service
The increasing tempo of work in a kitchen,
accompanied by increasing heat, noise and
personal stress, were factors highlighted by
the survey participants (Maguire & Howacd
2001). One interviewee stated: "When ser-
vice time starts in the restaurant the
tempo can rise tenfold ... the heat can
mean that tempers get frayed." Anothet par-
ticipant said: "It's not just the burns and the
cuts; it's a hot environment, it's a sweaty
environment. Tempers get frayed, idiots do
stupid things ... kitchen violence is another
thing."
This pressure for service often seems to
lead to an acceptance that safety standards
will drop:" ... the risk factor rises ... you
have to cut corners ..."; and "customers
don't want to know they can't have some-
thing because the equipment isn't working
... gravity-feed slicers or some electrical
equipment will be rendered dangerous and
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will be taped up until they can be dealt with
at the weekend - it's about muddling
[through] aud making do."
The inevitability of outcome due to the
pressure for service that is augmented by
increasing customer expectations appeared
pervasive in responses: "With a restaurant
full of people, a brigade working flat out
with reduced staff levels and increased pub-
lic expectation in terms of preparation and
skills, something has got to give ..."
It could be argued that the catering indus-
try's pursuit of service quality has, in fact,
led to an increase in its customers' demands,
which has in turn increased the pressure for
service quality.
The roles of chefs and others 10 safety
management
The ehef
The unique position ofthe chefas a first line
manager in the organisation has significant
implications for safety management.
One chef made his views on the autono-
my and autocracy of the chef very clear: "A
chef is the ultimate ruler of his kitchen - he
has to be." The extent to which this 'rule'
includes a responsibility for safety manage-
ment seems to vary among chefs. Another
chef obviously held himself responsible for
the safety ofkitcben staff (the 'brigade') aud
related this to personal pride in hiswork and
conunon humanity rather than to the law or
the poliey of the otgauisation. It must be
remembered, however, that the chefs inter-
viewed were lecturer chefs and this attitude
of responsibility towards the brigade may
result from the fact that the brigade mem-
bers in this case were students rather than
employees. It may not apply to the industty
as a whole. Other chefs reported the less
positive attitudes of head chefs for whom
they had worked: "X ... nice enough guy,
but he'd walk round every morning [saying]
~ right, yeab?' ... shake your haud aud ask
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ifyou were all right and the first thing you
would say ... 'Well, to be honest my world's
dropped apart' aud the next thing he'd do
was shake your haud [aud say1'Okay fine'
and he'd walk to the next person; it was like
he wasn't really listening."
This lack of concern is perhaps not
unconunon in many industries but examples
were alsogiven ofmore specificdisregard for
employees' welfare. The master baker told of
situations where a manager knew that a Prw>
tice was dangerous but simply said: "Just get
on with it." The baker explained that "they
[managers] are compromised. in the work-
place when pressured by employers aud ...
have ultimately to decide on risk-taking".
Another chef described a situation where
a chef made a kitchen employee complete a
shift despite what he described as a "dread-
ful burn" from a hot oil spillage. The victim
eventually had to wait with the injury for
three hours before reaching an accident and
emergency unit.
One interviewee, however, said that the
chef should have a participative approach to
safety management: "It needs to be brought
down to a personal level to make them
understand why rather than just say 'This is
what you've got to do: you do it!'; and mak-
ing them understand how; ... Putting this
into practice isquire difficult" Again, it should
be emphasised that this is the statement of a
lecturer rather than an industry chef.
Interestingly. when asked. about their own
role as 'safety managers', many of the chefs
answered in terms of hygiene, cleaning
schedules, electrical equipment maintenance
and so on. Little attention was given to the
less tangible aspects of safety management
such as designating responsibility and set-
ting safety priorities.
Other managers in theorganisatWn
As far as the role ofother managers working
outside the kitchen is concerned, the auton-
-
HOWARO & MAGUIRE
omy ofthe chef appears to have been central
to the participants' views. This is illustrated
in the following response: "The food. and
beverage manager will have some influence
with the head chef but very few of the oth-
ers would - I was going to use the word
'dare' but I don't know if that's appropriate
- but very few of the others would want to
become involved because it is a complex
environment; there are specific skills
involved." This participant strongly refuted
the suggestion that any (non-chef) manager
could deputise for the head chef despite
acceptance of the idea that the head chef
could deputise for other managers, at least
for short periods.
Another participant also conunented on
the lack of influence that other managers
seem to have over kitchen activities: "Some
managers feel inadequate in the area ... a lot
of managers have avoided any kitchen expe-
rience, and that's not to say a manager has
to have [such experience] ... but obviously it
would be helpful ... [look at1the number of
kitchens which have been badly designed
and badly planned."
The detachment of senior managers from
what goes on in the kitchen is not, it seems,
due entirely to the attitude of senior man-
agers themselves. As one participant put it
when asked if chefs discourage interference
from others: "I have to say it's not all man-
agement's fault. The chefs are as much to
blame for obviously trying to deliberately
exclude people from those areas - their
domain as it were - and making sure no-
one's ever allowed past the hot plate." He
also referred to the influence that the chef
inevitably has over behaviour in the
kitchen (in this case hygiene behaviour):
"It's about leadership ... I've worked with
some head chefs and their cleanliness is sec-
ond to none ... the kitchen is spotless ... and




Pressure for service, just as pressure for pro-
duction in manufacturing industries, is like-
ly to be a major influence on safety climate.
The autonomy and autocracy of the chef
mean that the attitude of the chef to safety
issues makes a major contribution to safety
climate in the kitchen. The low level of
influence exercised by other managers
increases this effect. The participants in this
study made a number of conunents that are
telling in this context.
The catering industry is largely non-
unionised. The worker participation ele-
ment of the Robens self-regulation model
therefore tends to be limited as worker
involvement has been promoted largely by
the trade unions. One chef, who had experi-
ence of working in hospital kitchens, con-
sidered that safety issues were taken more
seriously in the National Health Service
through the involvement of trade union
safety representatives. This is in accordance
with Zohar's central fmding that safety cli-
mate (ie employees' perceptions about the
relative importance of safe conduct in their
occupational behaviour) is strongly influ-
enced by the extent of employee involve-
ment, by management attitude to such
involvementand by management attitude to
safety generally (Zohar 1980). An example
of managers tolerating the practice of over-
riding safety interlocks was typical of many
that described an attitude prevalent in the
industry.
Any discussion of management attitudes
to kitchen safety must be set in the context
of attitudes to kitchen staff generally.
During the interviews, there was a stated
perception that kitchen staff are sometimes
not afforded the same consideration given
to other groups of staff. One participant, by
way of example, conunented on the lack of
intervention by senior management in a case
where a head chef had intentionally burnt a
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member of the kitchen staff with a hot
palette knife: "Re burnt someone with a
palette knife or branded him across the arm
with a hot palette knife just for the fun of it
- but it seems to be that as long as nobody
else picks up on that and the food's okay, the
rest of the organisation will ignore it. You
know, in other words, it's the kitchen
domain - let's leave them; they're a bit ...
animal in [their] instincts."
It may, however, be argued that a contri-
bution to a poor safety climate in the
kitchen is a degree of complicity from the
brigade itself: One chef reported witnessing
a particularly bad kitchen accident in which
a person received severe burns from head to
toe "caused by slipping while carrying a
large stock pot". The person did not return
to work after the injury. In describing this
incident the chef explained the attitude of
the brigade in terms of: "We had to contin-
ue ... the show must go on." Parallelscan be
drawn with battle situations and theatri-
cal performances (Maguire & Howard
2001).
In terms of safety climate, it is interesting
to note that the attention of the food indus-
try as a whole has been focused on food
safety issues since the coming into force of
the Food Safety (General Food Hygiene)
Regulations 1985. Indeed, the HSE/Local
Authorities Enforcement Liaison Committee
(HELA) has recently expressed concern that
enforcement resources have been diverted
away from occupational safety and health to
food safety activity (HELA 2000). If this is
the case, then safety climate may have suf-
fered as 'food safety climate' has improved.
Comparisons with manufacturing
industry
The participants in the study made reference
to perceived differences between safety man-
agement in the service industries, such as
catering, and those in manufacturing or pro-
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duction line situations. As one chef put it:
"In a factory, everything is screwed down
and anything thar cuts has a safety guard.
Youcan't put a safety guard on a knife." The
difference in terms of pressure for produc-
tion between service and manufacturing
industries was also commented on. One
chef said: "A deadline in catering is immov-
able, unlike other industries."
The autonomy of the chef and the dis-
tance at which other managers are kept from
kitchen activities were also contrasted with
the factory situation by another participant:
"The chefworks very much on his own even
if he's part of a team - very much an indi-
vidual and is responsible an awful lot of the
time for his own individual equipment,
whereas I would imagine in a factory - obvi-
ously not being an expert - that managers
are more responsible for the overall equip-
ment." Although the emphasis here is on
equipment, it is recognised that kitchens
form a more distinctly separate part of a
catering business than do other discrete sec-
tions in organisations generally.
Discussion and conclusions
The authors' interviews with lecturer chefs
indicate that the concept ofservice quality is
deeply embedded in the culture of catering
kitchens, as it is in the hospitality industry
generally. This pressure for service quality,
especially the issue of service on time,
appears to result in a threshold shift in risk
tolerance (Maguire & Howard 2001).
The interviews revealed evidence of chefs
as first line managers encouraging, on some
occasions, unsafe behaviour to maintain ser-
vice or 'production'. This is similar to the
findings of Nichols & Arrnstrong (1973) in
relation to manufacturing industries. In this
case, however, there were suggestions of an
apparent complicity of the kitchen brigade
in this behaviour due, perhaps, to pride in
the job, loyalty to the customer or simply
--
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team spirit, which required the group objec-
tive to be achieved despite the risks; a situa-
tion not unique to catering.
The supervisory role of the chef is pivotal
to safety in the kitchen. The role of first line
managers generally in self-regulation has
been emphasised by Robens. The autonomy
enjoyed by chefs, with little external influ-
ence from more senior management, makes
their role in promoting a positive safety cul-
ture even more crucial.
Research by Nichols & Arrnstrong
(1973) showed that senior managers were
sometimes seen 'turning a blind eye' to
unsafe behaviour which their normal man-
agement responsibilities would require them
to control. The situation in the kitchen, it
would appear, is a little different. Here,
senior managers may occasionally 'turn a
blind eye' but this occurs within a context of
an already reduced management role in the
kitchen due to the chef's own autonomy.
In terms of maintaining: safety standards,
there are lessons to be learned for safety
advisers and for enforcement agencies.
Firstly, the chef appears to be central to safe-
ty management and attempts to encourage
positive safety behaviour must primarily be
directed at this key role. Secondly, the
kitchen culture and the pursuit ofgoals such
as service quality are strong influences and
must be borne in mind in any attempt to
improve safety management.
The key finding of the study is, therefore,
the effect that the pursuit of service quality
may have on safety climate. The question
arises as to how well safety considerations
can compete with the demand for service
quality in the perceptions of employees
when service quality is uppermost in the
mind of senior managers and the organisa-
tion as a whole.
It has been pointed out that good safety
management is usually a key clement of
profitability for many types of firm (HSE
--
1997b), but it has been shown that service
quality and safety in catering businesses are
often seen to be in conflict. This is the case
in many types of business, including manu-
facturing operations. However, whereas in
manufacturing companies the factors that
make good safety practice good business (ie
the total costs of accidents from sick pay,
equipment failure, first aid, investigation
costs, prosecution and so on) are fairly evi-
dent, they may be less so in catering busi-
nesses. This is because most catering opera-
tions are of a relatively small size, many are
of an ephemeral nature, and the nature of
the industry itself is quite disparate. For
these reasons, corporate consciousness of
the true costs of accidents and ill health is
slower to develop.
The phenomenon of a negative effect on
safety clima~ resulting from pressure for
service quality may be a factor within service
industries as a whole. It might be that the
intangible nature of some elements of ser-
vice quality requires from the workforce a
deeper culture of concurrence with the
organisation's efforts to provide a quality
service than is required from workers in tra-
ditional manufacturing industries in relation
to the production of goods - where compli-
ance with company rules is often sufficient.
This culture of concurrence may be found
difficult to override when it conflicts with
safety considerations.
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